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In this paper, I examine the plausibility of event-causal libertarianism, a prominent view
on free will which regards indeterminism in the causal history of a decision as necessary
for an agent’s moral responsibility for a subsequent action. Specifically, I investigate how
Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian account fares in light of Derk Pereboom’s powerful
“disappearing agent” objection, in addition to criticisms of my own. Kane concludes that
Pereboom’s objection is ineffective against his account. I argue against Kane’s conclusion
by highlighting a dilemma which results from Kane’s response to the disappearing agent
objection; either way Kane’s position is interpreted, his account is unsuccessful.

I
holds the view that free and responsible actions are caused indeterministically by antecedent
and responsible actions are the results of torn decisions1

will to bring about, when they will to do so, on purpose, rather than accidentally or inadvertently
or by mistake, without being coerced or compelled in doing so or willing to do so or otherwise
controlled in doing so or willing to do so by other agents or mechanisms” (p. 6).
control over a particular action if the action is undetermined (as in an event-causal situation)
Indeed, indeterminism would seem to prevent the agent’s possession of plural voluntary
an undetermined decision can still have plural voluntary control with respect to that decision,

facing a torn decisions (i.e., the agent is making at least two different efforts to do different
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control over a particular action if the action is undetermined (as in an event-causal situation)
Indeed, indeterminism would seem to prevent the agent’s possession of plural voluntary
an undetermined decision can still have plural voluntary control with respect to that decision,

facing a torn decisions (i.e., the agent is making at least two different efforts to do different

from either of the [efforts of will] can be said to be brought about by the agent. And it is owing
to the fact that either [effort of will] might succeed in attaining its goal, which would thereby
be brought about by the agent’s goal-directed cognitive process, that the agent exercises plural

II

This objection involves an agent facing an undetermined decision. At some point before an
agent takes action, the agent’s causal contribution to the decision (her desires and reasons)
whether or not the decision will occur is unresolved. Pereboom concludes that, given this state
of affairs, no causal factor involving the agent determines whether or not the decision occurs,
and he therefore asserts that event-causal agents are not morally responsible. The success of this
In essence, Pereboom’s argument is the following: In an event-causal decision,
(i) Prior causal factors allow that an agent’s decision could either occur or not occur
(ii) The agent plays no further causal role in determining whether the decision does
or does not occur.
(iii) Therefore, the decision is not settled by any causal factor involving the agent,
and the agent cannot be considered morally responsible for her action.

undermined.

III

agent’s decision could either occur or not occur, and also that the agent plays no further causal
question of the decision’s occurrence is resolved by a causal factor involving the agent. Namely,
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the agent’s effort to bring about that choice” (p. 7). Even though antecedent events and states
decision will or will not occur, the agent is responsible because the resolution of her decision
amounts to an effort of will succeeding in expression. The successful expression of an agent’s
efforts of will is a causal factor involving the agent, and so Pereboom’s conclusion is incorrect.
causal account.

IV
maintains that the successful completion of an agent’s effort of will is a causal factor involving
the agent, but, interestingly, it is still the case that there is a time before the decision is resolved
at which point the agent plays no further causal role in resolving the decision. As a result,

disappearing agent objection is that an agent can be responsible for an action without playing a

the assumption that an agent can be fairly considered to be morally responsible for an action as
long as an agent-involving causal factor resolves her decision to act. If it is reasonable to believe
that the occurrence of an agent’s torn decision can be resolved by an agent-involving causal
factor, then Pereboom’s objection is ineffective.
In the event-causal situation, it is uncontroversial to conclude that there exists some time
prior to a decision’s resolution, t1, at which all agent-involving causal factors (reasons, desires,
etc., and efforts of will) are accounted for – a point after which the agent exerts no more causal
t1, there is more than one
physically possible outcome for the agent’s decision at a temporally subsequent time, t2.

the occurrence of indeterminate decisions is settled by an agent overcoming the obstacle of
implausible in light of the disappearing agent objection.
Instead, another understanding of torn decision resolution is more appropriate. In his
is settled at the moment of choice by the successful completion of the agent’s effort to bring
about that choice (p. 7). It is not immediately clear how this explanation might secure the
occurrence cannot be settled by the successful completion of her effort of will, and this is
because the settling of whether or not the decision occurs is the successful completion of an
agent her effort of will.
be, causally brought about) by the agent’s effort of will succeeding, which is equivalent to the
odd claim that something, D, is caused by D itself. This kind of notion may be true, but only in
the determination of whether a decision will occur is settled by the determination of whether a
becomes D. That is, how an in deterministic state of affairs with two possibilities (decision or
non-decision, presumably) turns into an agent’s resolved decision.
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V
the question remains of how an agent-involving causal factor might resolve whether or not an
agent’s decision is to occur. To resolve this issue, a cogent understanding of indeterminism’s

explanation of indeterminacy is unclear, and this ambiguity places his account in the midst of a
dilemma, both horns of which are detrimental.
functions either as an independent hindrance to each effort of will or as a kind of neural cointoss to determine whether a decision will occur. Whichever explanation of indeterminism is
causal agents. This presents a dilemma: his account is either incoherent or open to objection,

Neural Coin-toss Indeterminacy
indeterminacy is separate from agent-involving causal factors, and it becomes active after
efforts of will (and all other agent-involving causal factors) are in place to determine whether an
effort of will is to succeed in expression. This understanding of indeterminism, however, merely
randomizes the whether or not event-causal decisions will occur, and it is therefore unhelpful

objection.
If we interpret indeterminism as a neural coin-toss, no agent-involving causal factor
settles whether an agent’s decision will occur. A revision of the disappearing agent objection
could take the following form:
(i) The full causal contribution of antecedent agent-involving causal factors (reasons,
desires, and efforts of will) allow that a decision could either occur or not occur

agent’s causal contribution to the decision is exhausted to determine whether or not
the decision occurs.
(iii) The agent has no control over this neural coin-toss, and so this indeterminacy is
not an agent-involving causal factor.
(iv) The decision of whether the decision occurs is not settled by any causal factor
involving the agent, so the agent cannot be considered morally responsible for her
action.

Nothing about the agent causally determines the result of her decision, and therefore the
agent is not morally responsible.5
his event-causal account open to objection, and he has consistently rejected this understanding
Though it offers a clear explanation of how the occurrence
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responsibility.

Indeterministic Noise
responsibility. The second entails that his account is incoherent. Rejecting a neural coin-toss

Describing the relation of an agent’s effort of will to indeterminism,
indeterminism is a property of the effort, not something separate that occurs after or before

It appears that we should understand indeterminacy as a hindrance to the success of each
effort of will independently. That is, an effort of will is an agent’s attempt to perform a certain
action, but the effort of will is indeterministic in the sense that whether or not it will succeed in
.
This interpretation of indeterminism brings about an issue for an account which holds
that more than one effort of will can (and must) be active at t1
wherein two efforts have independent probabilities for success in action, and, consequently,
both efforts of will could succeed.6 This is impossible because torn decisions often include an
agent who is deciding between mutually exclusive options (either a businesswoman can decide
to help an assault victim or she can make it to an important business meeting).
it provides for the simultaneous expression of mutually exclusive actions. If we understand
alteration secures an agent’s responsibility either way a decision results at the cost of the his
account’s coherence.

VI
Some explanation which clears up how the undetermined state of affairs at t1 can be
causally transformed into an agent’s performing a certain action at t2

explanation of the causal role of indeterminism entails a dilemma.
functioning in one of two ways: either indeterminism settles the occurrence of the agent’s
decision as a neural coin-toss, or indeterminism functions in each effort of will independently
Consequently, his account either depicts agents whose decisions are
resolved by chance, or it allows an agent to simultaneously perform mutually exclusive actions.
The former leaves event-causal agents without moral responsibility, while the latter renders his
account incoherent.
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Endnotes
1.
is merely stylistic.
This explanation is ineffective because, as discussed, the causal effect of the agent’s efforts of
the agent makes no new efforts after t1. So, an agent’s ‘making an effort’ cannot resolve the
decision’s occurrence because whether or not it will occur is unresolved even after her efforts
of will are in place at time t1.
A question remains: once it has been determined that a decision will occur, which effort of will
is to succeed? For now, I assume that an agent can be responsible for an action as long as the
action is the result of a successful effort of will, even if the agent does not cause the occurrence
A key assumption for this objection is that, to be morally responsible, a causal factor involving the
agent must be determine an agent makes a decision. This is a mostly uncontroversial assumption,
or choices they will to bring about, when they will to do so, on purpose, rather than accidentally
5.

It is also the case that both efforts of will could fail, resulting in an agent’s inaction. This could
also bring about some odd situations, particularly when inaction is physically impossible. This
issue brings about further questions concerning whether or not an agent an agent must be able
to settle her own decision’s occurrence.

6.

It is also the case that both efforts of will could fail, resulting in an agent’s inaction. This could
also bring about some odd situations, particularly when inaction is physically impossible. This
issue brings about further questions concerning whether or not an agent an agent must be able
to settle her own decision’s occurrence.
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